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Abstract
Cuts in the marginal income tax rates brought about by the 1986 Tax
Reform Act have been credited or cursed with numerous supply side
effects. The purpose of the present study is to explore what effects,
if any, changes in the marginal income tax rates might be expected to
have on retirement behavior and lifetime labor supply. A model of tax
and retirement behavior is developed in the standard life-cycle mode.
A basic proposition of the model is that an increase in the marginal
tax rate reduces the planned retirement age if leisure and consumption
are substitutes, and increases it if they are complements. The
elasticity of substitution is estimated using cross-section data and
found to be less than one, implying complementarity between consump-
tion and leisure. It follows that tax increases tend to increase the
retirement age and lifetime labor supply, while tax cuts have the
opposite effect. The results. are shown to hold even after allowing
for a bequest motive and uncertain lifetimes.
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THE EFFECT OF INCOME TAXATION ON THE RETIREMENT AGE
AND LIFETIME LABOR SUPPLY
I. Introduction
There is a growing literature treating the retirement decision as
endogenous within a life-cycle model. In the typical model, retire-
ment choice is based on the maximization of an intertemporal utility
function subject to a lifetime budget constraint. Since these models
are generally too complicated to solve analytically even under restric-
tive assumptions, there is often a very loose connection between the
life-cycle model and the estimation model. A typical empirical model
relates the age of retirement to a set of explanatory variables in-
cluding health status, net social security and private pension bene-
2
fits, assets, job characteristics, wages, and the like. Sometimes,
estimates from the empirical model are fed back into the life-cycle
model so that retirement behavior can be simulated under alternative
3
policy regimes.
The focus of this study is the relationship between retirement
behavior and changes in the wage. The income tax, by lowering the
wage rate, generates a substitution effect favoring earlier retirement
and an income effect favoring later retirement if leisure is a normal
good. The net result is ambiguous depending on the relative strengths
of the two effects.
Empirical studies of the role of the wage in the retirement deci-
sion generally find little or no relationship. For example, while
Hurd and Boskin (1984) find substantial retirement effects of health
status and mandatory retirement provisions, they find little systematic
-2-
variation of the wage with retirement probabilities. For some ages,
the wage is positively related to the probability of retirement; for
other ages, it is negatively related. Likewise, Quinn (1977) finds no
evidence that the individual's wage rate is an important determinant
of retirement status.
The inability of empirical studies to pick, up an association be-
tween retirement behavior and the wage may be due to correlation be-
tween the wage rate and retirement benefits or may be due to restric-
tions placed on earnings by the social security retirement test.
Further, since retirement and earnings are directly correlated, earn-
ings cannot be used as an explanatory variable in studies that use
4
actual retirement behavior as the dependent variable.
The present study takes an analytical approach to deriving the
relationship between the wage and retirement behavior. The retirement
decision is modeled within a life-cycle framework in which the
retirement age is set so as to equate desired lifetime consumption
with desired lifetime earnings after taxes. The individual maximizes
an intertemporal utility function subject to a lifetime budget con-
straint. The assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure allows us to sign the derivative of
optimal (planned) retirement with respect to changes in the marginal
tax rate. The basic proposition of the model is that an increase in
the marginal tax rate reduces the planned retirement age if leisure
and consumption are substitutes and increases it if they are comple-
ments.
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A simple test of the relationship between consumption and leisure
is conducted using data extracted from the Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). The elasticity of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure is estimated from the coefficients of a leisure
share equation derived from the structural model.
The model begins with the premise that intertemporal utility
depends only on the consumption and leisure paths and that lifetimes
are certain. Later versions of the model admit a bequest motive and
uncertain lifetimes. The results of the model are shown to hold in
the extended model.
Section II describes the life-cycle model and section III reports
on the results of a simple empirical test. A bequest motive and
uncertain life expectancy are introduced in sections IV and V, and the
implications of the results are discussed in section VI.
II. Theoretical Expectations
The model of this study is in the tradition of models developed by
Sheshinski (1978) and Crawford and Lilien (1981). Sheshinski develops
an intertemporal utility maximization model in which it is assumed
that workers work full time or not at all. The individual jointly
chooses an optimum consumption path and retirement plan. Crawford and
Lilien relax the assumptions of perfect capital markets, certain life-
times, and actuarially fair pension systems, but assume a zero rate of
interest and zero rate of time preference.
The model of the present study extends the earlier work by allow-
ing for variable hours of work prior to retirement and for positive
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rates of interest and time preference. It is assumed that the tax-
payer has a time-invariant utility function of the constant elasticity
of substitution form (CES):
(1) U(t) - a C(t) b + (1-a) L(t) b
where C(t) is consumption in period t, L(t) is hours devoted to
leisure in time period t, a is a constant between zero and one, and b
is a constant less than or equal to one. In the special case when b
is equal to zero, the utility function becomes Cobb-Douglas; as b goes
to one, consumption and leisure become perfect substitutes and as b
goes to minus infinity, they become perfect complements.
The taxpayer seeks to maximize lifetime utility:
T
(2) U - / [a C(t)
b
+ (1-a) L(t) b ] e" pt dt
where T is the known life-span of the taxpayer and p is the fixed rate
of time preference. In the model of this section, there is no bequest
motive and no uncertainty. These assumptions are relaxed later.
In the maximization, the taxpayer is constrained by the following
budget constraint:
.
(3) A = S(t) - w (k - L(t)) + r A(t) - C(t)
.
where A is the change in asset holdings in time t, S(t) is saving in
time t, w is the after-tax wage rate, k is the time available each
period for work and leisure, r is the interest rate, A(t) is the asset
level in period t, and C(t) is consumption in period t. Leisure, L(t)
is less than k during the working period and equal to k during the
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retirement period. The constraint states that the change in the value
of the taxpayer's assets at each instant in time is equal to saving
after tax. Inheritances and bequests are ignored for the time being
o
by assuming A(0) = A(T) - 0.
The Hamiltonian for this optimal control problem is:
(4) H - e"
pt
[a C(t) b + (1-a) L(t) b ] + X(t) [w (k - L(t))
+ r A(t) - C(t)] + u(t) (k - L(t))
where X(t) and u(t) are multiplier functions associated with the
satisfaction of the constraints. Then,
(5a) a b e" Pt CCt) 5
" 1
- X(t) =
(5b) (1-a) b e" pt L(t) b_1 - w X(t) - u(t) =
(5c) X(t) = -X(t) r
(5d) A(0) = A(T) =
(5e) |iCt) (k- L(t)) -
are the first-order conditions for an extremum. Recognizing that u(t)
equals zero when t < R (the retirement age) and u(t) is positive when
t > or to R, these can be solved for the time paths of consumption
and leisure:
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(6a) C(t) - C(0) e~gt
(6b) L(t) = L(0) e"gt t < R
= k t > or = R
where g = (p - r)/(l - b).
Since L(R) = k - L(0)e~gR , it follows that L(0) = k egR . Further,
since C(0)/L(0) = wS (a/(l-a)) s , where s » l/(l-b), we have
C(0) = w (a/(l-a)) k e5 , and the time paths for consumption and
leisure are seen to depend on the wage rate, the utility parameters,
total time available, and the retirement age:
(7a) C(t) » wS (a/(l-a)) S k eg(R
"C)
(7b) L(t) = k eg(R_t) t < R
= k t > or - R
Consumption and leisure will either increase or decrease over the
lifetime depending on the sign of g. If r is greater than p, then g
will be negative, and consumption and leisure will increase over the
taxpayer's lifetime.
Lifetime consumption, C, is found by integrating the discounted
value of taxpayer consumption over the lifetime:
T
(8) C - / C(t) e"
rt dt
- w
S (a/(l-a)) s k egR [(1 - e"zT )/z]
-7-
where z g + r. Likewise, lifetime earnings can be calculated by
integrating the discounted value of taxpayer earnings over the working
lifetime:
R
(9) M - / w (k - L(t)) e"
rC
dt
= w k [(1 - e"
rR )/r] - w k egR [(1 - e"zR )/z]
Since inheritances and bequests are ruled out of this section, it
follows that lifetime consumption must equal lifetime earnings,
F - M - C - 0. Substituting from (8) and (9) gives:
(10) F - v k [( 1 - e~
rR )/r] - w k egR [(1 - e"zR )/z]
- w
S (a/(l-a)) 8 k egR [(1 - e~zT )/z] =
The effect of an earnings tax on the retirement decision is found
by differentiating F with respect to the retirement age, R, and the
wage rate, w. After simplification using equation (10), this gives,
respectively:
(11a) F
R
- -g w k e
gR
[(1 - e"
zR )/z]
(lib) F - (1-s) w3
" 1 (a/(l-a)) s k egR [(1 - e~zT )/z]
w
Note that F_ is always positive as long as g is negative (which occurs
9
when r is greater than p). F is positive if s 3 1/ ( 1—b) is less
w
than one, which occurs if b is negative (recall that b is always less
than one). If b is positive, F is negative.
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The partial derivative of R with respect to w may be found by
employing the implicit function rule:
(12) 3R/3w = -F /F
which is positive if b is positive and conversely if b is negative.
If b is equal to zero, s is equal to one and F is equal to zero so
that 3R/3w is not defined.
Hence, we have the following proposition that an increase in the
wage rate increases the retirement age so long as current consumption
and leisure are substitutes (b is greater than zero). If leisure and
consumption are complements (b is less than zero), an increase in the
wage rate reduces the retirement age. This implies that an income
tax, which reduces the wage rate, reduces the retirement age so long
as consumption and leisure are substitutes, and increases the retire-
ment age if they are complements.
The model can also be used to assess the effect of changes in
taxation on lifetime labor supply. Following Blinder (1974, p. 76) in
defining lifetime labor supply, H, as lifetime earnings, M, normalized
by the wage rate, w, we have from equation (9):
(13) H - M/w = k [(1 - e"rR )/r] - w k egR [(1 - e"zR )/z]
Differentiating with respect to w gives:
(14) 3H/3w » -g k egR [(1 - e"zR )/z] 3R/3w
which has the same sign as 3R/3w as long as g is negative (r is
greater than p). Hence, the same conclusions apply to lifetime labor
-9-
supply as apply to the retirement decision: an increase in the wage
rate 'increases lifetime labor supply so long as current consumption
and leisure are substitutes (b is greater than zero). If leisure and
consumption are complements (b is less than zero), an increase in the
wage rate reduces lifetime labor supply. This implies that an income
tax, which reduces the wage rate, reduces lifetime labor supply so
long as consumption and leisure are substitutes, and increases life-
time labor supply if they are complements.
III. Empirical Results
The purpose of the empirical model is to test whether consumption
and leisure are substitutes or complements. The estimation model for
nonretired taxpayers is obtained by dividing equation (7b) by (7a):
(15) L(t)/C(t) = (a/(l-a)fS w"S
or in log form:
(16) In [L(t)/C(t)] =» -s In (a/(l-a)) -s In w
Since s 1/ ( 1—b) is always positive, the model states that the
leisure-consumption ratio is negatively related to the wage rate
(i.e., people with higher wage rates have lower leisure-consumption
ratios). By estimating s using ordinary least squares regression
analysis, we obtain an estimate of b (s-l)/s which is unbiased and
efficient. A standard t-test can then be used to determine whether
b is greater than or less than zero and thereby determine whether
leisure and consumption are substitutes or complements.
-10-
The problem in estimating equation (16) using data from a standard
cross-section of households is that generally information on consump-
tion is not available in those data sets that are rich in information
on labor supply. Fortunately, the Michigan Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) contains both consumption and labor supply informa-
tion. This study utilizes the 1986 panel for the 1984 interviewing
year. Nonretired households whose family head is between the ages of
20 and 60 were selected for the estimation. Further, unmarried per-
sons, families on welfare or social security, and families with an
unemployed household head were excluded from the estimation sample.
This provides a subsample of households for which wage rate data are
available and whose work/consumption decisions are not biased by high
implicit marginal tax rates (as with AFDC recipients, say). The
estimation subsample includes 1,675 households.
Hours of leisure, L(t), are calculated for the head of the house-
hold by subtracting hours worked per year from total time available, k
(assumed to equal 8,760 24 hours per day times 365 days per year).
Since the unemployed were excluded from the subsample, no adjustment
for time spent seeking employment was necessary.
The consumption variable, C(t), was constructed by summing those
items of consumption available in the PSID data. These included
annual food expenditures at home and away from home, annual rent for
renting families, annual property taxes and mortgage payment for
homeowning families, and total federal income taxes. Hence, most tax,
shelter, and food costs were included in the consumption variable.
Other items of consumption such as transportation, entertainment, and
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clothing were not available in the data set and could not be included
in the consumption variable.
The wage rate was put on an after-tax basis by multiplying by one
minus the household's marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate was
imputed based on the household's taxable income, number of exemptions,
and the tax table used. Taxpayers were either assigned the standard
deduction (zero-bracket amount) or an average itemized deduction for
their taxable income bracket depending on whether or not the family
itemized deductions. For families itemizing deductions, the amount of
the itemized deduction was calculated by applying an average fraction
of income determined from the 1982 Statistics of Income — Individual
Tax Returns to the family's taxable income. The deduction for married
couples when both work was calculated by subtracting from gross income
10% of the earned income of the lesser-earning spouse, regardless of
whether or not the couple itemized deductions.
The results of the estimation were:
(17) In [L(t)/C(t)] = 1.084 - .814 In w
(19.631) (-30.427)
2 2
R » .3573 Adj R = .3570 F = 925.782
where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. The estimated coef-
ficients both test significantly different from zero at the .99
2 2
confidence level. The R and adjusted R statistics indicate good
explanatory power for a cross-section regression, and the F statistic
confirms the explanatory power of the wage variable at the .99 con-
fidence level.
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The estimated coefficients in equation (17) can be used to derive
estimates of the model parameters, s l/(l-b) and a. From equation
(16) and the estimated parameters from equation (17), we have:
(18a) -s In (a/(l-a)) = 1.084
-s = -.814
Working backward, since s .814, b (s-l)/s = -.228. Further, since
In (a/(l-a)) = 1 .084/(-.814) - -1.332, a/(l-a) = .264 and a = .209.
Gustman and Steinmeir (1986) estimate s and b, respectively, as .87
and -.15.
A standard t-test can be used to test whether b is significantly
different from zero (or equivalently whether s is significantly dif-
ferent from one). It is easily confirmed that indeed s is less than
one and b is less than zero. This implies that leisure and consump-
tion are complements and chat an increase in the wage rate reduces the
retirement age. This in turn implies that an income tax, since it
reduces the wage rate, increases the retirement age and increases
lifetime labor supply.
IV. Adding a Bequest Motive
The model to this point assumes no bequest motive. To test the
sensitivity of the results to that assumption, a bequest motive is
introduced into the model in this section.
The lifetime utility function, previously a function of lifetime
consumption and leisure, must be modified to account for bequests and
their utility to the individual. A standard practice is to augment
-13-
the lifetime utility function with a utility bequest function,
B[A(T)]:
T
(19) U - / [a C(t)
b
+ (1-a) L(t) b ] e" pt dt + B[A(T)]
.
where B is an increasing function of assets in time T. The terminal
condition for the model is no longer A(T) 0, but depends on the
optimal bequest set so as to maximize U.
The optimal bequest is determined by solving the following the
following transversality condition for A(T):
(20) X(T) - B»[A(T)]
where X(T) is the shadow price of wealth in period T and B'[A(T)] is
the marginal utility of the bequest. The transversality condition
states that the optimal bequest is determined by equating the marginal
utility of the bequest with its shadow price.
The shadow price, X(T), is also equal, by equation (5a), to:
(21) X(T) = a b e" pT C(T) b
" 1
which in turn can be rewritten, after substitution from equation (7a),
as:
(22) X(T) - a b e" pT [w 9 (a/(l-a)) s k e^*
-1
*] 5
" 1
Assuming that the utility bequest function has the same general
1 — 8 8
form as the lifetime utility function, B[A(T)] =» d A(T) /8, where
8 < 1, we get by differentiation:
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(23) B'[A(T)] = d 1
" 8
A(T) 8
" 1
Then, substituting from equations (20), (22), and (23), simplifying by
setting 8 = b, and solving for A(T), gives the optimal bequest:
(24) A(T) = d b"S (1-a)"9 wS k egR ersT
The assumption that 6 b is not appealing since it restricts the
bequest and utility functions to have the same elasticity. It is
shown in footnote 11 that the results carry through if b and 8 are
unequal but have the same sign.
To find the effect of a wage change on the retirement age, the F
function of equation (10) must be rewritten to recognize that lifetime
income now equals lifetime consumption plus bequests, so that
F - M - C - A(T) - 0. Substituting from equation (24) gives:
(25) P-ikKl- e"rR )/r] - w k egR [(1 - e"zR)/z]
- w
S (a/(l-a)) S k egR [(1 - e~zT )/z]
-db (1-a) wke°e =0
The effect of a wage change on the retirement decision can be
found, as we did before, by differentiating F with respect to R and w.
This gives, respectively:
(26a) F
R
-
-w k g e
gR
[(1 - e~
zR)/z]
(26b) F = (1-s) (ws_1 (a/(l-a)) s k egR [(1 - e~zT )/z]
w
j u" s r\ n~s s-1 , gR ,rsT-.+db (1-a) w ke°d }
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As before, FD is always positive as long as g is negative (which&
occurs when r is greater than p). F is positive if s * 1/(1 —b ) is
less than one, which occurs if b is negative (recall that b is always
less than one). If b is positive, F is negative.
w
The partial derivative of R with respect to w, found as before
according to 8R/8w ~F_/F , is positive if b is positive and con-
Is, w
versely if b is negative. Hence, the conclusions of the earlier
section carry through: an increase in the wage rate increases the
retirement age so long as current consumption and leisure are substi-
tutes (b is greater than zero). If leisure and consumption are
complements (b is less than zero), an Increase in the wage rate
reduces the retirement age. This implies that an income tax, which
reduces the wage rate, reduces the retirement age so long as consump-
tion and leisure are substitutes, and increases the retirement age if
they are complements. Adding a bequest motive in no way affects the
expectations of the theoretical model.
V. Uncertain Lifetime
Until now, the model has been based on the assumption of a
definite time horizon. Relaxing that assumption, we assume that the
individual's lifetime is unknown. Let D(t) be the probability of
dying by time t, D'(t) the associated probability density function,
and T be an upper bound on possible lifetimes (D(T) 1).
Following Kamien and Schwartz (1981), the individual's lifetime
utility function must now be rewritten:
-16-
T s
(27) U - / D'(t) {/ [a C(s)
b
+ (1-a) L(s) b ] e" PS ds
+ B[A(t)]} dt
which can be shown to be equivalent to:
T
(28) U - / {[a C(t)
b
+ (1-a) L(t) b ] [l-D(t) ] e" pt
+ B[A(t)] D'(t)} dt
where [l-D(t)] is the probability of living at least until t and D'(t)
is the probability of dying at t. All the previous results carry
through except that now g (p + m - r)/(l - b) where m - D' (t)/[l-D(t)
]
is the conditional probability density of dying at t given survival
until then. Hence, the effect of the uncertainty is the same as an
increase in the time preference, p.
The conclusions of the model are not affected so long as g remains
negative. If m is sufficiently large to make g positive, then F_ is
negative, and all conclusions are reversed. However, we would also in
this case observe consumption decreasing over the lifecycle and the
retirement phase occurring at the beginning of the life cycle. Hence,
we will continue to assume that g is negative although larger (in
absolute value) than in the certain time horizon case.
VI. Policy Implications and Conclusions
The first generation models of labor supply and taxation gener-
ally found backward-bending labor supply functions for male heads of
households. Hence, they would predict that an increase in taxes, by
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reducing the disposable wage, moved workers down their backward-bending
labor supply functions and resulted in an increase in work effort.
The present study extends the earlier models to adopt a lifetime
perspective and focus on the retirement and lifetime labor supply
decisions. Yet it arrives at a conclusion similar to those of the
older, static models; namely that an increase in taxes leads to an
increase in the retirement age and an increase in lifetime labor
supply. This conclusion resulted from the empirical finding that
consumption and leisure are complementary goods and is independent of
the no-bequest motive and definite time horizon assumptions.
This study treats the effect of the personal income tax as a pure
wage effect. In practice, the tax is nonlinear and taxes interest as
well as wage income. Further, various provisions of the income tax
12
such as Keoghs and IRAs may affect saving and retirement. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) introduced a new two-tier tax rate system,
15% and 28%, with 33% applying to many taxpayers in the middle income
area. Under TRA, IRAs and Keoghs are still available, but on a
restricted basis. As Kendall (1988) points out, a key to analyzing
the impact of these changes is whether or not taxpayers view them as
temporary or permanent. An interesting extension of the present model
would be to allow for uncertainty with respect to future tax rates and
provisions.
In order to simplify the problem and focus on income tax effects,
this study disregarded the potential impact of social security on Che
retirement decision. While this may be acceptable in a simple model,
more realistic models of retirement behavior need to incorporate the
-18-
social security system. To do so introduces many complications that
are beyond the scope of this study. For example, while workers
between the ages of 62 and 64 lose benefits to the earnings test, they
recoup most or all of them through an actuarial adjustment of future
benefits. Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980) believe that on balance,
if the social security law were understood by the public, work disin-
13
centives would only affect a small minority of the population.
The present study is in no way meant to be a direct test of the
effect of the income tax on retirement behavior. Important variables
14
such as health status and job characteristics do not enter the model.
The model provides only an indirect test of the impact of the wage on
planned retirement behavior using a single cross-section of data. On
the other hand, it succeeds, where more sophisticated models fail, in
shedding light on the relationship between retirement and tax-induced
changes in the wage.
-19-
FOOTNOTES
1. See Killingsworth (1983), chapter 5, for a description of dynamic
labor supply models.
2. Burtless and Moffitt (1984) provide an example of this type of
study. They find that retirement depends on age dependent
preferences, but that the age of retirement is rather insensitive
to social security benefit levels.
3. Fields and Mitchell (1984) and Gustman and Steinmeir (1986)
conduct simulation studies of the retirement decision.
4. A study by Hall and Johnson (1980) is one of the few to focus on
the planned retirement age rather than the actual retirement
decision.
5. The approach of this study contrasts with that of some recent
empirical studies such as Hanoch and Honig (1983) and Hurd and
Boskin (1984), which treat the retirement decision as a labor
force participation decision of the elderly. By contrast, the
present study estimates a model of current consumption and labor
supply and uses the estimation results to infer retirement
behavior.
6. Two goods are substitutes if an increase in the price of one
leads to a decrease in quantity demanded of the other. Two goods
are complements if the opposite holds.
7. Social security taxes and benefits are ignored in the model.
This is legitimate so long as the social security system is
actuarially fair, there are no borrowing constraints, and life-
times are certain. Some recent studies have found it possible to
relax these assumptions. Kahn (1988), for example, investigates
the effect of social security on the retirement decision within a
life-cycle model incorporating liquidity constraints.
8. This assumption is relaxed in section IV.
9. The assumption that g is negative is consistent with the observa-
tion that workers take retirement at the end of their working
career rather than at the beginning. A positive g would indicate
the reverse.
10. Blinder (1974) introduces bequests into the utility function in
this manner.
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11. When 8 is not equal to b, the expression for F^ is unaffected,
but the expression for Fw must be rewritten as follows:
F = (1-s) {wS_1 (a/(l-a)) S k egR [(1 - e"zT )/z]
w
+ (S/b) [(l-B)/(l-b)] d w' 1 [b"s w3 (1-a)"8 egR e«T, [(b-l)/(S-l)]
Fw is positive if both b and 8 are negative, negative if both
b and 8 are positive, and of indeterminate sign if b and 8 are of
opposite sign. Hence, 8R/3w ~Fr/Fw is positive if both b and
6 are positive, negative if they are both negative, and of
indeterminate sign if b and 8 are of opposite sign. Adding a
bequest motive does not change the expectations of the theo-
retical model if b and 8 are unequal but of the same sign.
12. Hubbard (1984) estimates an extended life-cycle model on cross-
section data. His results indicate that IRAs and Keoghs stimu-
late saving and that the increase depends positively on the
marginal tax rate. He does not consider retirement effects.
13. Empirical evidence of the impact of social security, on the
retirement decision is mixed. For example, Diamond and Hausman
(1984 a and b) find that the presence of pension and social
security benefits have a significant effect on retirement
decison, with pre-age 65 social security benefits explaining
about "half the story" of early retirement; on the other hand,
Kotlikoff (1979) finds little or no relationship between social
security and the retirement decision, although social security
appears to significantly reduce private saving. Likewise, an
empirical cross-section study of retirement decisions by Gordon
and Blinder (1980) casts serious doubt on previous claims that
the social security system induces many workers to retire earlier
than they otherwise would.
14. There is considerable controversy in the economics literature
over the effect of health status on retirement. While Hall and
Johnson (1980) found that health influences planned retirement,
Boskin (1977) found that current health status, measured by
annual hours ill, is not signficant to the retirement decision.
The effect of job characteristics on the age of retirement
was explored by Filer and Petri (1988). Their results support
the hypothesis that jobs that are differentially difficult for
older workers to perform appear to be those from which workers
retire early.
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